Sunday, June 25, 2017

The Toronto Victory Parade

I missed this news, but at last year's gay Pride Parade in Toronto, the parade evolved from a pride parade to a victory parade:

On Sunday, Black Lives Matter activists pulled off the sort of victory that right-wing hooligans could only hope to achieve: They stopped a gay pride parade.

“We are calling you out!” Alexandria Williams, co-founder of the group’s Toronto chapter, shouted through a megaphone as the Black Lives Matter float came to a halt and marchers sat down. Amid rainbow-colored smoke bombs, she accused event organizers of harboring “a historical and current culture of anti-blackness” -- a curious claim considering how the festival welcomed Black Lives Matter as “guests of honor.”

Black Lives Matter refused to budge unless pride organizers acquiesced to a list of demands[.]

The parade organizers caved in 30 minutes.

Consider what happened. The gay pride parade was supposed to highlight the bravery of people coming out in defiance of historical oppression and suppression.

And then the parade organizers were promoted to the ranks of the oppressors by the BLM "guests."

Mission accomplished. You guys (and/or gals) are the generation that won the war. You have been deemed insufficiently victimized to be in the coalition of the "victims."

Allow me to extend a belated congratulations to the LGBT community! You've clearly made it to the ranks of privilege! Welcome!

Oh, and note the inability of the LA Times reporter to simply report the facts and instead insert a leftist fantasy world where "right-wing hooligans" would have halted the parade if they could--and if left-wing BLM bullies hadn't done it in reality.

Will there even be a Pride Parade this year in Toronto? Wouldn't it be like having a white pride parade (what with their own historical and current culture of anti-blackness tarnishing their motives), now, under the circumstances?

The Usual Suspect

The Saudis nailed terrorists who planned to strike Mecca's Grand Mosque.

The article speculates it was ISIL.

But given that Iran-Saudi tensions are high, and given Iran's desire to run the holy sites in Saudi Arabia for all Moslems, I wouldn't be shocked if Iran was behind this. Even if the attackers are Sunni Arabs, Iran has worked with these types.

And the attackers might not even know their true backers.

Pure speculation on my part, of course. But Iran has in the past tried to sow chaos in Mecca.

Saturday, June 24, 2017

... From the Small Sea

Russian aggression has turned the Baltic Sea from a post-Cold War sleepy backwater into a renewed potential theater of war. NATO exercises in the first half of the month show the change.

NATO forces in the Baltic Sea have returned to preparing for major fighting:

[Russia-NATO friction] has brought the BALTOPS exercise back to preparing Alliance navies for high-end maritime warfighting. And while fighting off small boats is still part of the exercise, the fifty ships, roughly fifty aircraft, and 4,000 personnel from twelve NATO nations, are really in the Baltic to sharpen their skills in anti-submarine warfare, air defense, amphibious landings, mine hunting, and the integration of air and maritime power.

Those skills would be useful to contain and crush Russia's Kaliningrad exclave and to support NATO forces in the Baltic states--whether in falling back, in defended enclaves, in irregular warfare, or in a counter-attack--should Russia invade.

In related news about the Marine gear stored in Norwegian caves, this would be a good idea:

As the world changes and more attention shifts to Europe, planners are exploring the possibility of expanding the gear cache stored in the caves — possibly even doubling or tripling its capacity.

A Marine Expeditionary Brigade's worth of equipment and supplies to sustain them until supply lines can catch up would be very useful for Baltic scenarios.

And no, extending the presence of American Marines in Norway won't harm Norwegian-Russian relations:

Norway's decision to extend the presence of U.S. Marines on its soil will worsen relations with neighboring Russia and could escalate tensions on NATO's northern flank, the Russian embassy in Oslo told Reuters on Saturday.

The Russians being aggressive a-holes already soured relations. The Marines are a reaction to those poorer relations.

We're no longer in the placeholder "post-Cold War" era. I hope historians won't name it some type of "pre-war" era.

And no, I don't assume Putin--for all his bluster--will drive the naming of this era.

An Idea is Stupid Even if China Adopts It

3. 2. 1. ... Let the China worshipping commence!

The Chinese navy is taking arsenal ships in a new direction—as giant submersibles. Post-Cold War naval theorists have long dreamed of recreating the old battleships' power through massive "arsenal ships," or warships carrying hundreds of guided missiles that could fire at land and sea targets. Now it looks like China wants to make that dream a reality.

Have a ball, Peking. I couldn't care less.

In an age of network-centric warfare, why spend the effort to make a platform-centric queen of the sea?

In a network-centric world, [America] can't afford to have so much of our offensive firepower in a sea control mission concentrated on so few aircraft carrier hulls.

But what comes up? Let's build different platforms--arsenal ships--to concentrate our missiles on a few high value targets.

Mind you, if not for the possibility of these ships being sunk with all their missiles aboard going down with them, I'd say sure, these are great. After all, those converted ballistic missile subs are basically arsenal subs--and are great.

But we had already built the hulls, so converting them was a relatively cheap additional cost. If the choice was building even less vulnerable (than surface ships) new arsenal subs or putting the same amount of missiles across our fleet, I'd go with the latter.

We need an Arsenal Navy with anti-ship and land-attack missiles (and eventually rail guns on our surface ships) scattered across the surface and subsurface fleet and carried in planes and helicopters above them.

And if during war we find we do need to cram some offensive missiles on a hull, why not make a Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser (Arsenal Ship) [NOTE: see p. 50 here for my article on the concept, albeit for an Army audience]?

Mass effect--not platforms.

I wish China all the best on this. But do not under any circumstances use their dream to argue for an American counterpart. I just don't care if a dread Arsenal Ship Gap develops.

Islamophobia Alert

I'm sure that the Western COEXIST brigades will get right on condemning this government outrage:

In the northwest Xinjiang province the [Chinese provincial] government announced more new laws intended to curb separatist attitudes among the Moslems who dominate this region. The new rules mandate that all Moslem children (those under age 16) have their names changed if local government officials determine that the name is “too Moslem.” That would include names like Islam, Quran, Mecca, Jihad, Imam, Saddam, Hajj, Medina or Arafat. Children receive their national ID cards at age 16 and must now have “non-threatening” name. The government is also collecting DNA samples from all non-Han residents of Xinjiang.

And recall that the Han Chinese "immigrated" to Xinjiang and are smothering the local people's culture through Han-imposed comformity and demographic changes.

UPDATE: To keep jihadis out, Libya has banned people from Yemen, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Bangladesh, and Syria; and threw in Palestinians, too.

More COEXIST bumper stickers, stat!

Friday, June 23, 2017

Don't Blame the Tank Models


Europe dreams of a common military but has too many types of tanks[.]

America has but one type, by contrast. Yeah, that's why America is stronger? Give me a break.

The article says that European Union (EU) states have 17 different main battle tanks (MBTs) and that this is symbolic of why the EU doesn't have a single military.

Well, the main reason is that the EU is not an actual political entity despite its proto-imperial status and ambitions for being an empire that suppresses nation-states currently members of the EU.

And it is not a surprise that European states have multiple tanks because the tanks largely predate the EU. States design or buy them--not the EU.

Further, the number 17 is BS.

In my 2012 The Military Balance, I count 14. The EU paper cited probably (it does not list the tanks) counted variations that I ignored as separate MBTs.

And the number shrinks when you subtract different (albeit better) versions of the basic version of the tanks that I initially included in my count. So cut the number to 9.

Then you can subtract American and Russian models in European service. Now we are down to 5 different tanks that Europe makes.

I'd subtract one more because otherwise you penalize Germany for building a newer and better model.

So really, Europe has 4 indigenous tanks made by Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. With other European states having German, American, or Russian tanks--or variations of those tanks.

Ten thousand types of officially recognized cheeses? Good. Four tank models? Bad. Got it.

If European armies are weak, it is not because of too many tank designs. Russia has three in service with 3 more types in storage. Russia has many more tanks than the Europeans.

If the question is why the EU doesn't have a military, it is because only the new Euro royalty want that.

If the question is why Europe doesn't have much of a combined military, it is because Europe disarmed  (and much of what is left is often civil servants in uniforms) and spends too much time trying to unify shrinking national assets rather than just build more combat units that fight.

(Strategypage has more, but comparing Germany's effort to absorb smaller allied militaries to the all-powerful science fiction Borg is misleading.)

By EU logic, if 17 types of MBT is a bad thing and just one is great, having no MBTs at all must be superpower status!

And really, that's all the EU wants. Status from having a monopoly on military power--the ultimate definition of modern sovereignty:

Essentially, the new defense hype is about abandoning and redefining sovereignty at the EU level, such as when states are called on to synchronize national defense-planning cycles. It is about giving up the little sovereignty states have left in defense for a greater good: jointly building a larger European capacity to act, to successfully manage real-world problems.

But if the EU is actually the empire their apparatchiki desire it to be, they won't care if that military provides actual defense capacity as NATO does. Ditching NATO and the inconveniently necessary Americans who provide actual capacity to manage real-world problems in favor of a "pure" EU military is the goal.

An EU military is just the means to the imperial end.

The Master Something or Another

The Germans have a long history of not liking America very much.

The Germans seem to have gone from proclaiming themselves the master race to pretending to be the master moralists.

Germany is certainly our ally. But they continually make it hard to think well of them--and I'm not even harboring grudges over two world wars.

Zombie Army

This FMSO short paper addresses the dramatic shift of the Syrian army (Syrian Arab Army: SyAA) from an army to a hybrid army-militia force:

The SyAA is itself held together by a diffuse network of volunteer militias that are plugged into its chain of command and patronage system at different nodes of the system, making the SyAA all the more resilient.

The SyAA remains the single strongest force in the country in terms of weaponry and reach. Its impending demise has been a constant of Syrian conflict analyses ever since 2012. This prediction, often based on decontextualized analysis of shifts in territorial control, has overlooked the important ways in which the SyAA has adapted to the ongoing conflict. Barring direct intervention by hostile foreign powers, the SyAA’s main battlefield threat will remain its own ineptitude and corruption, rather than the rebel forces.

I admit I kept looking for the Syrian army to collapse. But I based it on casualties and not territory.

Indeed, early on I assumed Assad had to give up territory to survive.

The monograph also says that the Alawites grew tired of dying for Assad and wanted someone else to step up. That too was part of my repeated question of how much more could the army endure in defense of the minority Alawite government.

I termed the transformation as one of the Syrian army becoming fiefdoms that in many ways resembled an advise and assist force with a backbone of logistics and heavy weapons fleshed out by militias--both domestic and foreign:

The Syrian army has collapsed. In a way it is like an advise and support force of firepower, armor, and logistics backed by air power sent in to help poorly trained local forces fight their war. And without local forces--whether Syrian or imported militias--the Syrian army would be unable to fight the war.

Without an army as we understand it, Assad does not truly control Syria. Regional entities based on the army divisions run their areas as sub-state sovereigns.

I've stopped asking whether the army will collapse. But I wouldn't be shocked if portions of it did collapse or quietly (or not so quietly) pull out of the war effort at Assad's command.

The Syrian army really has suffered heavy casualties. Perhaps it can't die. But it does not live.

Thursday, June 22, 2017

The Healing Powers of "And"

Seriously? The amount of money spent on NATO defense is not important?

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently renewed the Trump administration’s calls for 2% defense spending commitments by European members of the alliance; but as German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel asserted, “more money doesn’t mean more security.”[1] Instead of simply meeting budgetary recommendations, an analysis of small state security potential and funding of smarter, more cost-effective contributions to the alliance is needed.

If I may be so bold, when America calls for more money in NATO defense budgets, we assume it isn't all spent on hookers, booze, and photocopier ink. We assume you analyze your defense needs within the NATO alliance and make appropriate decisions on how to spend more money.

As for saying that instead of more money the Baltic states should focus on intelligence and special forces to combat "hybrid" warfare, you know my feelings about that buzz word.

"Hybrid" warfare is simply Russia invading a country and denying they are invading a country--and we go along with the fiction.

I feel like I'm on crazy pills every time the subject comes up.

Stop basing our defense policies on the unique situation of Russia invading Ukraine's Crimea and eastern Donbas while denying it during a period when the new Ukrainian government lacked the legitimacy and command and control to order resistance to the invasion.

Special forces and intelligence are absolutely useful for the Baltic NATO states to fight a guerrilla war as Russian forces roll over them. I want our special forces to help with that, too.

And special forces surely would be useful to fight "little green men" Russian special forces posing as locals.

But well trained infantry with armor and firepower support would also be useful against little green men if ordered by the legitimate Baltic governments to go after the little green men.

And if Baltic states focus on so-called "hybrid" war, the Russians can simply invade with armor and rapidly roll over the Baltic special forces.

Face it, Baltic anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons backed by engineers who can slow down a Russian conventional invasion are useful and would buy time for special forces to link up with mobilized reservists trained to act as irregulars and guerrillas to resist the Russians.

To their credit, the authors argue for that Baltic state capability. But they say that the Baltic states can't match the conventional capabilities of larger NATO states. With all due respect, duh. Of course the small Baltic states can't rely on their own militaries to provide the ability to defeat the Russians in battle. If that's all they are saying, I'm fine with it. But in the context of focusing on hybrid warfare, I think they go down a false path.

Spend more money on defense. And spend it with some sense of reality about the threat.

And stop acting like "hybrid" warfare is a new and significant thing.

Paging Buffy Summers

This is ominous:

It might sound like science fiction, or a recent episode of "Silicon Valley," but a start-up called Ambrosia is charging $8,000 for blood transfusions from young people.

About 100 people have signed up to receive an infusion, founder Dr. Jesse Karmazin said Wednesday at the Code Conference.

With this kind of thinking, aren't we a couple pointy teeth from a vampire problem?

And won't liberals demand sharp stick control to prevent a backlash against the Persons of Pallor community?

I'm stocking up on Mister Pointy, just in case.

Tip to Instapundit.

Aiming to Fight "Over There"

The latest Department of Defense China military report confirms my impressions a year ago of China's new military district commands.

I wrote of the new Chinese military district commands:

The new map seems to be one not of facing threats to be absorbed and defeated as the old regions were designed (although the southern Cold War region certainly saw China's forces on offense against India and Vietnam).

Chinese power is strong enough to merge all of the west into a single district.

The Russian threat from Mongolia and the Pacific region is so low that this can be merged.

A larger region faces South Korea and Japan which have greater power projection capabilities that China can now meet at sea.

Another faces Taiwan as it did before, but now with a greater chance of actually invading Taiwan rather than resisting an American-assisted Taiwan invasion to renew the Chinese Civil War.

And the last one faces the South China Sea which China is trying to absorb into "historical" Chinese territory.

To me, this new design of Chinese military districts demonstrates increased Chinese confidence and a commitment to taking a war outside of China's borders.

In regard to China's new commands, the latest Department of Defense report on China's military states:

Taiwan remains the PLA’s main “strategic direction,” one of the geographic areas the leadership identifies as endowed with strategic importance. Other focus areas include the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and China’s borders with India and North Korea. PLA reforms appear to have oriented each new theater command toward a specific set of contingencies.

The strategic direction named as focusing on North Korea is true enough. But it could easily be focused on Russia's Far East if ending a "century of humiliation" includes restoring Chinese control of territory taken from China by Russia in the 19th century. That's what I had in mind for the command I noted second, although North Korea implicitly is folded in there.

And the first district I mention encompassed India and, to a lesser degree, Central Asia as the focus in my mind.

Growing capabilities are increasing Chinese ambitions.

Wednesday, June 21, 2017

To Emit or Not to Emit, That is the Question

Is this the future of the Army?

“If we don’t win the cyber/EW fight, then the maneuver fight may not matter because we may not get to it,” Maj. Gen. Wilson Shoffner, director of operations, Army Rapid Capabilities Office, said during a presentation at the beginning of June, noting that the decisive fight may well be the electromagnetic spectrum as opposed to maneuver. ...

Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work discussed how this new paradigm will affect future conflict, explaining last October that the “old adage was … if you can be seen you can be hit, and if you can be hit, you can be killed. The new adage is if you emit, you die.”

So to survive the Army has to have the electronic emission profile of an 18th century army?

That's a lot to ask of an army that has to find an enemy and fight it. At some point, you have to emit in order to kill.

Yes, we have to suppress a lot of our troop electromagnetic emissions to avoid enemy massed firepower. But it can't be just that unless you want to field 18th century armies.

Part of suppressing emissions has to be converting 360 emissions that can be detected with point-to-point emissions hugging the earth that can't be detected. You may need to string short-ranged directional emissions or even wires again once you enter the enemy firing envelope.

You may need mobile 360-burst emissions that send and receive accumulated transmissions and then shut down emissions to displace before the enemy can shoot at it. There might be large numbers of these mobile, perhaps robotic, communications systems.

And where we need to have continuously emitting systems, make them autonomous drones cheap enough to be considered expendable. Use them like ammunition or any other consumable, providing information to manned systems with line-of-site or wired links. The enemy will destroy them, but with enough put into action continuously, we will retain continuous necessary emissions and allow our units to find enemies and shoot.

For the manned systems, we will need active defenses that can buy time for the unit under fire to displace out of the target zone by taking out incoming rounds. Maybe the autonomous drones get the active defense role to emit and shoot at incoming rounds while they can in order to let the manned systems escape.

I just don't think that we can totally suppress emissions if we want the Army to fight rather than just evade attack.

Trying to Win, I Hope

It looks like America will send 4,000 more troops to Afghanistan, mostly to help our Afghan allies fight the Taliban jihadis:

The Pentagon will send almost 4,000 additional American forces to Afghanistan, a Trump administration official said Thursday, hoping to break a stalemate in a war that has now passed to a third U.S. commander in chief. The deployment will be the largest of American manpower under Donald Trump’s young presidency.

That's the floated number, anyway. I assume NATO will send some number lower than what we send.

Oh, and this is puzzling:

In 2009, Obama authorized a surge of 30,000 troops into Afghanistan, bringing the total there to more than 100,000, before drawing down over the rest of his presidency.

Obama implemented two surges in 2009. Look at the troop numbers.

This chart shows the changes before the final Obama surge of 30,000 troops that brought our commitment to 100,000.

President Obama nearly tripled American troops in Afghanistan from the level under Bush in January 2009 when Bush left office. Why minimize what Obama ordered?

It's like the media wants to reduce Obama's role in the fight by minimizing his escalations that still left us with a losing war effort. Baldor and Burns should know better.

The excuse may be that the first surge of 2009 was "authorized" before Obama took office, following battlefield victory in Iraq. But have no doubt that if Obama did not agree with this surge, it would not have happened. The Bush plans were coordinated with the incoming Obama administration.

Remember, Bush fully intended to remain in Iraq after 2011. Obama reversed that goal.

Don't start the "quagmire" wailing with a small increase. I'm sorry that our jihadi enemies are persistent. Yet it is better to support hundreds of thousands of allied Afghan soldiers and police who fight and kill jihadis over there than it is to let the Afghan government fail or fall and claim the sole role in fighting jihadis who will have a big sanctuary to plot attacks on the West.

We really did reduce our presence far below what was necessary to support the Afghan forces, and they have lost ground to the Taliban and other jihadis.

And it would really help if our problem child Pakistan didn't work both sides of the war, undermining our effort to fight jihadis over there.

UPDATE: Related thoughts. With a reminder, as I've long noted, that Pakistan is where a large part of our Afghanistan problem lies.

Taiwan Needs a Taiwan Model of Defense

The idea of Taiwan rejecting subs and relying on the Iranian model of deterring America fails by the simple fact that Taiwan is trying to deter China and not America from invading Taiwan.

Good Lord, control of Iran is not a core interest of America as controlling Taiwan is a self-proclaimed core interest of China. This is nonsense:

In developing a more asymmetric strategy, Taiwan would do well to study the Iranian example. Like Taiwan, Iran faces the challenge of deterring the United States, an objectively stronger military power — albeit one much farther from Iranian shores than China is from Taiwan’s — from using regional maritime and air superiority to impose its will. Iran has managed to change the U.S. and regional Arab military calculus primarily through the development and employment of asymmetric capabilities integrated with conventional military forces.

Urging Taiwan to mimic Iran's ability to deter an American attack neglects that Taiwan is an island rather than a large land mass with land lines of communication that America can't reach.

Urging Taiwan to mimic Iran's ability to deter an American attack neglects that Taiwan lacks the ability to interfere with the world's oil supplies as Iran possesses.

Urging Taiwan to mimic Iran's ability to deter an American attack neglects that China intends to absorb Taiwan while America just wants to prevent Iran from controlling the Persian Gulf.

How does urging Iran to be the template for Taiwan even make sense with those major differences?

When you consider this basic flaw for Iran as a template for Taiwan, it seems almost pointless to address the authors further.

But I will anyway. Much of my criticism would mirror my criticism of the Hezbollah model another author advocated for Taiwan.Why some people think democratic Taiwan should mimic the civilian-killing attitudes of terrorist actors is beyond me.

So let me just address the Iran-model article's dismissal of Taiwan's submarine program:

At a time when Taiwan needs deterrent capabilities and needs them now, a 10-plus-year wait for a few squadrons of F-35s or 5-10 submarines is far too long. Instead, development of a resilient, survivable force with the ability to asymmetrically counter-attack is Taiwan’s best option for deterrence as well as defense.

Given the time it has taken to agree to upgrade Taiwan's old F-16s, I doubt F-35s are on the table.

New F-16s would fit better. Honestly, I'm not convinced Taiwan is willing to invest in their national defense enough to risk the F-35 falling into Chinese hands if China conquers Taiwan.

And to be fair, if Taiwan had bought the subs early in this millennium when they first expressed an interest, they'd have them now.

As for the big notion in the article that Taiwanese subs don't help Taiwan, first let me note that subs are part of Iran's military. I guess Iran doesn't follow the so-called Iran Model.

Second, Taiwanese subs would be a major factor in an asymmetric defense that the author advocates.

Chinese ASW capabilities aren't very advanced, and are certainly less potent than China's anti-ship and anti-aircraft capabilities. So modern Taiwanese subs capable of interfering by using missiles, torpedoes, and mines, with Chinese sea trade and threatening Chinese surface ships participating in a Chinese blockade or amphibious assault would be a very potent threat capable of surviving and fighting for a longer period of time.

Without subs, Taiwan would be helpless to counter for long a serious Chinese effort at sea and in the air to blockade Taiwan.

With subs, Taiwan can inflict pain on China rather than just endure the pain, relying on America to break the blockade--with all the risks of a wider war that entails.

Don't forget the subs. They are a key Taiwanese deterrent.

And don't forget naval mines. Lots of them. They are an under-appreciated weapon that could be acquired pretty rapidly.

Staggering Stupidity

I just have no use for the international human rights industry as a moral force.

American-backed Syrians are in the process of liberating Raqqa from ISIL control. Naturally, this is a reason for "human rights" types to fret:

"We note in particular that the intensification of air strikes, which have paved the ground for an SDF advance in Raqqa, has resulted not only in staggering loss of civilian life, but has also led to 160,000 civilians fleeing their homes and becoming internally displaced," Paulo Pinheiro, chairman of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry told the Human Rights Council.

Pinheiro provided only the adjective and not a count for the casualties, it should be noted.

Implicitly, Pinheiro would be happier if ISIL remained "peacefully" in control of Raqqa rather than expose these Syrian people to the risks of being liberated.

Naturally, the barrel bombing, chemical warfare using, starvation-inducing, area bombardment Syrian government mirrored Pinheiro's complaint by slamming America's coalition for causing civilian casualties.

Pinheiro can take a hike. The French at least had the decency to refrain from complaining about America until well after the liberation of France from Nazi control.

Tuesday, June 20, 2017

The Air Force Secretary Aims High

The Secretary of the Air Force has ordered the Air Force to aim higher:

In many respects, the Air Force and the nation are at a critical crossroads. We realize, as do our potential adversaries, that space is interconnected to American life and to U.S. military success. The time is now to integrate, elevate, and normalize space in the Air Force and thus assure continued American dominance in this most critical domain. ...

Today, we begin the process of standing up a new organization at the Pentagon that will be responsible for recruiting, training and equipping airmen involved in the space mission. The establishment of the deputy chief of staff for space operations is the next step toward ensuring that we maintain space superiority.

They are on the launch pad, at least. But space requires more than three stars for a leader.

I've long been a proponent of the Air Force aiming high to become the United States Aerospace Force to dominate the Earth-Moon system (a Space Navy can wait for inter-planetary missions).

So this new process for going to space is good. As far as it goes.

But the move to space has the related effect of reinforcing the Air Force's institutional inability to see the mud where ground troops hug the Earth waiting for fire support from the Air Force.

I mean, seriously, WTF?

Perhaps the space focus explains why the A-10 is still in danger despite Air Force claims to have found Jesus on the close air support mission.

So while it is good that the Air Force is shifting to space, it should be accompanied by the recreation of the Army Army Force tied to the Army. Send the A-10s, other CAS aircraft, ISR, and SAR (along with the funding) to the Army Air Force. And have the Marines remind the Army how it is done, given they've had this all along.

The United States Air Force needs to become the United States Aerospace Force.

Capabilities Open Options

This article notes that improved Chinese relations with Russia since 1985 allowed China to transition their military posture from absorbing a Russian invasion from the north to projecting power around their periphery. Since the collapse of the USSR, the power balance has shifted much more to China. The continued shift from that event could have more effects on Chinese military posture.

The Chinese are looking south to the seas without the threat of Russia looming over Chinese territorial integrity:

Appointing a naval officer to command a theater in unprecedented in PLA history, further confirming the shift of China’s military posture from continental defense to maritime security. Moreover, ADM Yuan’s position as commander of the Southern Theater Command indicates the relative importance of South China Sea in the eyes of the PLA, particularly as a suitable bastion for its growing SSBN force and as an ideal operational space for its expanding surface fleet.

But how much more does China need at sea other than a SSBN bastion?

At some point, with the balance of forces shifting more to China and with Chinese economic interests encompassing the interior of Asia, China may shift their increasingly offensive military posture to offense on land to the resource-rich and once Chinese north that is weakly held by Russia rather than at sea defended by America and our constellation of allies.

But until that change in posture, the Chinese can closely observe their potential land foe, eh?

The Cyber-Fight for THAAD

The American THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea has gotten its own cyber-defense unit to protect it from hackers:

In May 2017 the United States revealed that it had sent one of its few cyber protection teams to defend the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) battery sent to South Korea earlier and declared operational in April. ... To work properly the battery depends a lot of networks for quickly transmitting target and other data. Since China, Russia and North Korea all have excellent network hacking capabilities and have been hostile to the stationing of a THAAD battery in South Korea, it was expected that the THAAD networks would be subject to penetration and disruption attempts by foreign hackers.

Neither the THAAD nor the cyber protection teams have had any real combat experience. THAAD has been successful in tests but the army is still seeking a realistic way to test the effectiveness of the cyber protection teams.

Strategypage notes that creating cyber protection units is stymied by the need to hire contractors to make up for the lack of in-house talent.

This is normal for new systems. Very early in artillery introduction, artillery was provided by contractors because armies did not have the expertise.

Privatized warfare is normal. In time as the cyber capability matures, that expertise will reside in-house.

You Had One Job

The Air Force is our resident expert on dropping bombs and other explody devices from airplanes.

So how was this possible?
On Aug. 7, 2014, the United States kicks off air strikes against the brutal terrorists in Iraq, beginning attacks on its members in neighboring Syria the following month. But between August and November 2014, the Air Force saw between 11 and 19 percent of weapons either not have the intended effect or not detonate entirely, according to a briefing Air Force Major Brian Baker gave at the National Defense Industry Association’s Precision Strike Annual Review in March 2017.

The problem was that the Air Force in Afghanistan had been using bombs designed for close air support--using smaller amounts of explosives or air bursts using shrapnel--to avoid killing friendly troops nearby while precision killed the enemy.

When switched to Iraq to fight ISIL which in June had overrun Mosul and northern Iraq, the Air Force largely went after targets far from friendly troops with the same weapons when they would have been better targeted by larger bombs with bigger explosions.

I'm not even sure what to say.

Monday, June 19, 2017

Accept the Home Field Advantage

Japan is right to worry:

Concern is rising in Japan the Chinese military may be training for a future mission in the disputed Senkaku Islands, where Beijing has been dispatching coast guard ships at increasing frequency in recent years.

Quoting the Pentagon's 2017 survey of the Chinese military, Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun reported Thursday the People's Liberation Army could be training for a raid of outlying areas, including the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands, also claimed by China and Taiwan.

In a section on China's amphibious capabilities, the report from the U.S. Department of Defense states the "PLA Army focuses its amphibious efforts on a Taiwan invasion while the PLA Navy Marine Corps focuses on small island seizures in the South China Sea, with a potential emerging mission in the Senkakus."

Japan needs to dig in on their islands to defend them rather than hope they can win a race with the Chinese to plant troops on the ground.

Because if China wins the race, will Japan eject the Chinese when China makes nuclear threats to hold what the Chinese take?

Guilt Requires Atonement and Not Abdication

If it was really guilt for their Nazi past rather than a convenient excuse to avoid spending on defense, you'd think the Germans would be eager to defend the free West.

Is this nonsense excuse for Germany to rely on others for defense incapable of being killed?

Modern Germany, says Sheehan, "thinks of its military very much the way most states think of their police force".

What he calls a "persistent distrust of military institutions," he adds, "continues to be strong, and in some ways has become stronger".

Underlying all this is the enduring memory of the horrors of World War Two - not only the shame of Nazi crimes but also the devastation inflicted on civilians.

Let me (again) apply the clue bat:

I keep reading that the Germans hate their militaristic past so much that they don't want to fight.

Let's try applying the clue bat to Germany's collective skull on this issue.

Conquering and setting up death camps under the shield of a powerful military? That's bad. By all means, don't do that.

Having a military capable of fighting death cult enemies or stopping the Russians from moving west? Well, that's a good thing. Try doing that.

Why do people essentially justifying Germany's refusal to shoulder their share of the burden of defending the West go back to Nazi Germany as the alternative to Germany's conveniently low-cost pacifism?

Consider that the Cold War West German military was formidable. Even in 1995 (which is the oldest Military Balance I have), Germany spend 2.2% of its GDP on defense.

Germany had an army of over 250,000 with nearly 3,000 tanks in 3 airborne, 9 tank, 10 mechanized infantry, and 1 mountain brigades. Plus odds and ends.

The German navy had 17 submarines, 14 principal surface combatants, and 36 smaller vessels and 40 mine warfare ships. And the navy had 54 fighter planes.

The air force had just under 500 combat aircraft!

And this is after being drawn down from Cold War levels! Guilt from World War II didn't stop Germany from having a good military then. Why now?

Today, the British would call the police if the German army was reported to have landed on the Dover coastal region.

Envisioning a German military capable of fighting in defense of NATO and the West does not need to go back to Nazi Germany.

Seriously, are people worried that after 60 years of being part of the democratic and free West that Germany is in danger of getting aggressive imperial ambitions again with a side trip of genocide?

Just go back 20 years to a democratic Germany that still had a sizable military even if it didn't reach Cold War levels. NATO defenses would be good if Germany built the force structure of the mid-1990s.

Just stop the Nazi excuses for refusing to help defend the West.

How Sad is Russia's Nuclear Deterrent Force?


Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday that elements of a U.S. anti-missile system in Alaska and South Korea were a challenge to Russia and that Moscow had no choice but to build up its own forces in response.

We have a thin missile defense force and Russia has a massive offensive nuclear force.

If America's missile defenses are a challenge to Russia, should we question whether Russia really has an effective missile force in reality as opposed to on paper?

The only way America's missile defenses are a challenge is if Russia's nuclear missile force is a Potemkin Deterrent with few missiles in working order.

Much of Russia's conventional military is a wreck, with only pockets of excellence backed by a narrow slice of adequate. Should I assume that Russia's nuclear force is any different despite the importance of getting that part right to make up for the weakness of the conventional military (especially compared to the long land borders of Russia)?

Or is it possible that Russia, which is in the midst of a policy of appeasement to China obscured by provoking tensions with NATO that is no threat, needs a convenient--if flimsy--excuse to build up forces in the Far East that otherwise would look uncomfortably anti-Chinese.

So what is going on?